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Multilayer Governance as a Theoretical Foundation of Enhanced Cooperation 
 
 
Discussion Topic: what does enhanced cooperation mean and what is its contribution 
to multistakeholder participation in particular and Internet Governance in general? 
 
Key words: Democracy, Enhanced Cooperation, Internet Governance, Multilayer 
Governance, Multistakeholder Participation  
 
Abstract:  
For strengthening public confidence in the decision-building processes, Internet 
governance needs to involve more actors, traditionally not granted with sovereign 
powers, such as business entities, non-governmental organizations, and civil society. 
In the recent past, the details of this much-debated multistakeholder concept have 
been amended by the “enhanced cooperation” approach. Actors from many fields 
have acknowledged that structural concepts dealing with the involvement of 
stakeholders having different backgrounds and functions are not yet established; 
therefore, new extended concepts beyond the classic realm are needed, 
encompassing different layers of decision-building procedures and realizing a higher 
degree of democratic participation.  
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I. Introduction 
As experience has shown, Internet 
governance needs to involve more 
actors, traditionally not granted with 
sovereign powers, such as business 
entities, non-governmental 
organizations, and civil society. The 
joint involvement of all stakeholders 
strengthens public confidence in the 
decision-making processes. The 
details of the multistakeholderism 
concept, however, are hotly debated 
and have recently been amended by 
the “enhanced cooperation” approach. 
In view of these developments the 
general foundations of enhanced 
cooperation are to be analyzed in more 
detail. This assessment will be done on 
the basis of the multilayer governance 
concept which appears to constitute 
the most appropriate framework for an 
adequate structuring of enhanced 
cooperation regimes. 
II. Concept of Multilayer Governance 
A. Decentralized Government 
Networks 
During the last few years newly 
structured concepts of decision-
building emerged on the basis of 
different networks approaches, 
encompassing elements such as 
flexibility, problem-solving capacity and 
efficiency. Thereby, from a theoretical 
perspective, normative institutionalism 
has been replaced by a functionally 
oriented concept.1 
                                            
1
  See RAINER NICKEL, Participatory Transnational 
Governance, in: CHRISTIAN JOERGES/ERNST-
ULRICH PETERSMANN (eds.) Constitutionalism, 
Multilevel Trade Governance and Social 
Regulation, Oxford 2006, 157-198, at p. 167; 
see also ROLF H. WEBER, New Sovereignty 
Concepts in the Age of Internet?, Journal of 
Internet Law 14(8) (2010), 12-20, at pp. 16-18. 
The new approach of 
transgovernmental networks leading to 
sectorial legal rules is based on sets of 
direct interactions among sub-units of 
different governments which are not 
controlled by the decision-making 
bodies of the nation states.2 Since 
networks have an effect on this 
aggregation, the actual cooperation 
and achievement of a solution occurs 
on the basis of a “disaggregated 
sovereignty”.3 
Slaughter, in her well-known book “A 
New World Order”, tackles the 
“governance dilemma” by referring to 
“governmental networks”, being 
“relatively loose, cooperative 
arrangements across borders between 
and among like agencies that seek to 
respond to global issues”4 and that 
manage to close gaps through 
coordination among governments from 
different states, “creating a new sort of 
power, authority, and legitimacy”.5  
This model presupposes 
disaggregated states, each with its 
own powers, mandates, incentives, 
motivations, and abilities; contrary to 
the perception of unitary states 
according to traditional international 
law, Slaughter proposes that national 
governments should delegate their 
responsibilities and “actual sovereign 
                                            
2
  ROLF H. WEBER, Multilayered Governance in 
International Financial Regulation and 
Supervision, Journal of International Economic 
Law 13(3) (2010), 683-704, at p. 688. 
3
  KAL R. RAUSTIALA, The Architecture of 
International Cooperation: Transgovernmental 
Networks and the Future of International Law, 
Virginia Journal of International Law 43(1) 
(2002), at p. 11. 
4
  KENNETH ANDERSON, Book Review: Squaring 
the Circle? Reconciling Sovereignty and 
Global Governance through Global 
Government Network, Harvard Law Review 
118(4) (2005), 1255-1312, at p. 1257; see also 
ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER,  A New World Order, 
Princeton and Oxford 2004, at p. 14. 
5
  ANDERSON (fn 4), at p. 1257. 
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power to a limited number of supra-
national government officials”,6 who 
would then have to engage in intensive 
interactions as well as in the 
elaboration and adoption of codes of 
best practice and agreements on 
coordinated solutions to common 
problems. 
B. Notion of Multilayer Governance 
Globalization and regionalization 
increasingly call into question the 
traditional divide between state 
authority and private actors; moreover, 
different layers of governance (supra-
national, regional, national, intra-
national, and local) are developed in 
order to properly assess the regulatory 
interventions and their enforcement. 
Private regimes are part of the overall 
legal design and have a place in a 
multi-layer-structure, if developed with 
the objective of establishing an 
appropriate institutionalization, based 
on broad initiation and wide building 
support.7 
Consequently, legal scholars and 
political scientists increasingly focus on 
the allocation and the interaction of 
powers among different levels of 
governance as well as on the problem-
solving capacity of multilayer 
governance.8 
The allocation of regulatory powers to, 
and the balance within different levels 
of governance has become a crucial 
                                            
6
  SLAUGHTER (fn 4), at p. 263. 
7
  STEVEN BERNSTEIN/BENJAMIN CASHORE, Can 
non-state global governance be legitimate? An 
analytical framework, Regulation and 
Governance 1 (2007), 347-371. 
8
  For a general overview see THOMAS COTTIER, 
Multilayered Governance, Pluralism, and Moral 
Conflict, Indiana Journal of Global Legal 
Studies 16(2) (2009), 647-679, at pp. 655-73; 
FRITZ W. SCHARPF, Introduction: The Problem-
Solving Capacity of Multi-Level Governance, 
Journal of European Public Policy 4(4) (1997), 
520-538. 
topic in the discussions about 
sovereignty; it features the nationstate 
context and even more the 
international setting.9 In fact, the 
definition of the proper interaction of 
the different levels has a direct impact 
on an ideally coherent regulatory 
architecture of multilayer governance; 
in other words, multilayer governance 
proposes a process and direction.10 
The concept of multilayer governance 
requires common foundations 
applicable to all relevant layers, while 
at the same time it must respect 
diversity and pluralism in order to be 
commensurate with the respective 
level of integration.11 Consequently, 
multilayer governance needs to 
develop normative guidance as to how 
relations between different layers of 
governance should be framed in a 
coherent and not fragmented manner, 
encompassing both analytical and 
prospective issues in building upon 
observations of legal phenomena.12  
In a nutshell, multilayer governance 
relies upon a common and shared 
body of underlying values and 
normative principles, which penetrate 
all layers of governance.13 Thereby, 
the core values shared by the 
international community are to be 
identified by directing the attention to 
the legal rights and obligations 
accepted by the major part of civil 
                                            
9
  WEBER (fn 2), at p. 689. 
10
  COTTIER (fn 8), at p. 656. 
11
  COTTIER (fn 8), at p. 656/7. 
12
  WEBER (fn 2), at p. 689. 
13
  COTTIER (fn 8), at p. 657; for a discussion of 
rights-based constitutionalism  see also ERNST-
ULRICH PETERSMANN, Multilevel Trade 
Governance in the WTO Requires Multilevel 
Constitutionalism, in: CHRISTIAN 
JOERGES/ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN (eds.) 
Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade 
Governance and Social Regulation, Oxford 
2006, 5-58, at p. 5. 
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society.14 In case of a proper 
assessment of these values, the 
ensuing legal framework possesses 
special legitimacy which is essential for 
the operation and effectiveness of 
law.15 
C. Multilayer Governance and 
Globalization 
In the context of the globalization 
debates, social scientists mainly refer 
to two models, namely universalism, 
stressing the existence and the 
normative potential of shared values 
on the one hand, and to 
cosmopolitanism, including the moral 
and political doctrine which extends to 
legal and institutional dimensions on 
the other hand.16 Different actors can 
institute processes by producing and 
disseminating rules that determine the 
behavioral patterns of the 
“participants”.17 
Multilayer governance leads to 
polycentric regulations occurring in 
multiple sites, shaped by practical 
issues and events.18 In an order of 
polycentric regulation the different 
communities involved in the rule-
making processes are becoming 
important actors. The weakness of the 
formal concept of polycentric regulation 
consists in the fact that the problems of 
rule-making pluralism and 
                                            
14
  See COTTIER (fn 8), at pp. 659/60. 
15
  WEBER (fn 2), at p. 690. 
16
  See COTTIER (fn 8), at p. 660; see also JOSEPH 
H. H. WEILER, Democratic or Technocratic 
Governance?, Jean Monnet Working Paper No 
6/01 (2001), at pp. 5/6. 
17
  See ROLF H. WEBER, Mapping and Structuring 
International Financial Regulation – A 
Theoretical Approach, European Banking Law 
Review 20(5)  (2009), 651-688, at p. 682. 
18
  JULIA BLACK, Constructing and Contesting 
Legitimacy and Accountability in Polycentric 
Regulatory Regimes, Regulation and 
Governance 2(2) (2008), 137-164, at pp. 139-
41. 
fragmentation are not (critically) 
assessed. 
As the information exchanges and the 
decision-making processes are moved 
to the most concerned participants of a 
specific market segment or the 
concerned regulatory regime a 
multistakeholder approach should be 
chosen and an enhanced cooperation 
concept must be developed.19 
Even if, over the years, different 
institutions and organizations are 
expanding their activities to new levels, 
the enhanced cooperation approach 
invites the adoption of a cooperative 
attitude towards the inclusion of non-
governmental organizations and 
interest groups in the rulemaking 
processes.20 While it is clear that the 
multiplicity of regulatory actors carries 
the substantial risk of incoherent 
rulemaking, such an approach would 
not necessarily entail an additional 
fragmentation of regulatory powers. In 
contrast, the aim of a more balanced 
allocation of powers could be achieved 
by mandating the regulatory actors to 
cooperate and consult with the various 
stakeholders.21 
III. Enhanced Cooperation Based on 
Multistakeholder Participation 
A. Notion of Enhanced 
Cooperation 
Enhanced cooperation is not a 
completely new concept but its 
importance recently increased in the 
Internet governance context by way of 
establishing new policy-making bodies. 
                                            
19
  ROLF H. WEBER, Shaping Internet Governance: 
Regulatory Challenges, Zurich 2009, at pp. 
88/9. 
20
  WEBER (fn 2), at p. 691. 
21
  WEBER (fn 2), at p. 691. 
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In general, multistakeholder 
participation and enhanced 
cooperation are confronted with the 
problem that structural concepts 
dealing with the involvement of many 
actors having different backgrounds 
and functions are not yet established. 
Foucault refers to the governmentality 
paradox with unclear institutional 
powers due to political and economic 
power shifts that effect governance 
institutions and practices in a global 
and digital era.22 Furthermore, a shift 
towards a “post-Westphalian mode of 
frame-setting” (Fraser) emanating from 
the emergence of other structures, 
both extra- and non-territorial, can be 
observed.23  
These developments call for new 
extended concepts beyond the 
classical realm, encompassing 
different layers of governance (supra-
national, regional, national, local). An 
increased focus on the interaction and 
the allocation of powers among 
different levels of governance are 
needed and the problem-solving 
capacity of such multilayer governance 
must be acknowledged.  
B. Principles of Bottom-up 
Participation 
1. Democratic Foundation 
Already Aristotle explained the best 
regime to be a combination of various 
features for the sake of the commons, 
however, he did not perceive 
democracy as the mandatory best 
                                            
22
  MICHEL FOUCAULT, Naissance de la 
biopolitique: Cours au Collège de France 
(1978-1979), Paris 2004, at p. 312 et seq.; 
MARIANNE I. FRANKLIN, Digital Dilemmas. 
Power, Resistance, and the Internet, Oxford 
2013, at pp. 11, 176  
23
  NANCY FRASER, Reframing Justice in a 
Globalizing World, New Left Review 36 (2005), 
69-88, at pp. 82/3. 
regime, but rather aristocracy.24 In 
aristocratic regimes, only a few are 
able to act as representatives for the 
benefit of the community; these ruling 
persons should act “with a view to what 
is best for the city and for those who 
participate in it”.25  
This (historic) perception shows that 
the bottom-up process may be 
implemented in practice by 
establishing a partly hierarchical order 
encompassing representatives from 
various fields of civil society and/or 
from different regions who themselves 
can elect legitimate individuals for the 
participation in the final decision-
building processes.26 
As mentioned, inclusion of civil society 
calls for a bottom-up process. Even if 
the various actors of civil society are 
independently organized, common 
strategies and goals can be developed; 
the bottom-up approach also enables 
the creation of new networks and 
facilitates the enlargement of the 
fundament for active participation of 
Internet users.27 The multistakeholder 
models must rely on ever increasing 
participation by those with interests, 
capacities, and needs.28 
                                            
24
  ARISTOTLE, The Politics of Aristotle, translated 
by BENJAMIN JOWETT, Oxford 1885, Vol. 1, 
Book III, Chapter 7, at p. 1279b. 
25
  Ibid, at p. 1279a. 
26
  See also ROLF H. WEBER/ROMANA WEBER, 
Social Contract for the Internet Community? 
Historical and Philosophical Theories as Basis 
for the Inclusion of Civil Society in Internet 
Governance?, SCRIPT-ed 6 (2009), 90-105, at 
pp. 94/5. 
27
  WEBER/WEBER (fn 26), at p. 94. 
28
  AVRI DORIA, Use [and Abuse] of 
Multistakeholderism in the Internet, in: ROXANA 
RADU/JEAN-MARIE CHENOU/ROLF H. WEBER 
(eds.) The Evolution of Global Internet 
Governance: Principles and Policies in the 
Making, Zurich 2013, 115-138, at p. 135. 
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2. Substantive Issues of 
Participation 
In elaborating the substantive issues of 
multistakeholder participation in more 
detail, the following factors should be 
taken into account:29 
(i) Openness: Access to 
discussions, negotiations and 
decisions must be open for interested 
and concerned persons. 
(ii) Transparency: Procedures have 
to be transparent in formal and 
substantive respects allowing to make 
an appropriate picture of the situations. 
(iii) Accessibility: Information sources 
need to be accessible for interested 
and concerned persons. 
(iv) Accountability: Decision-makers 
must be accountable to those being 
exposed to the respective decisions, 
i.e. responsibility is an important 
element in corporate structures. 
(v) Credibility: Decision-makers 
should seek to achieve an 
acknowledgment of their credibility by 
the concerned persons. 
(vi) Adequately resourced: Multi-
stakeholder involvement and 
participation requires sufficient human 
and financial resources in order to 
enable the respective processes. 
(vii) Consensus-based: Acceptability 
for decisions taken will increase if they 
are reached by consensus of all 
concerned persons and not by (sharp) 
majority votes. 
(viii) Opportunity for appeal/challenge: 
An entity of any nature should provide 
                                            
29
  JOE WAZ/PHILIP J. WEISER, Internet 
Governance: The Role of Multistakeholder 
Organizations, Journal of Telecommunications 
& High Technological Law 10 (2012), 331-350, 
at pp. 242/3. 
for a possibility to file a complaint 
against a given decision to an 
independent panel of "judges". 
(ix) Ability to resist capture: Decision-
making bodies must avoid to be 
captured by lobbying groups. 
3. Impact Perspectives 
A specific problem related to 
responsiveness and participation of 
civil society concerns the scope of 
impact actually reached. Obviously, a 
multistakeholder regime is not 
accomplished by merely providing the 
preconditions for the participation of 
civil society; moreover, the provision of 
a real and timely opportunity to shape 
policy output is needed.30  
As a consequence, an evaluation of 
the influence that the voices of the 
various stakeholders have on the 
decision-making process should be 
conducted; listening to the voices of 
the members of civil society may not 
become an alibi since in such case the 
outcome of the deliberations will not 
result in everyone’s welfare.31 
Even if there is not one single 
multistakeholder model, the concept 
encompasses different forms of 
participatory democracy that allows 
those who have a stake in a policy to 
take part in crafting the policy. The 
composition of the stakeholder groups 
may vary but generally all actors being 
involved in advocating the interests of 
the global public good are eligible for 
participation. 
                                            
30
  CHARLOTTE DANY, Civil Society Participation 
under Most Favorable Conditions: Assessing 
the Deliberative Quality of the WSIS, in: JENS 
STEFFEK/CLAUDIA KISSLING/PATRIZIA NANZ (eds.) 
Civil Society Participation in European and 
Global Governance, Paul Grave 2008, 53-70, 
at p. 61. 
31
  WEBER/WEBER (fn 26), at p. 101. 
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C. Structuring of the Processes 
1. Different Typological 
Approaches 
From a theoretical perspective, 
differentiations need to be made 
between the groups of involved actors 
and the authority relations between 
these actors. A possible approach is to 
be structured as follows: 
Often four different groups of actors 
are distinguished playing a role in the 
multistakeholder debates related to 
cyberspace regulation, namely (i) 
States, (ii) formal intergovernmental 
organizations (IGO), (iii) business 
entities, and (iv) non-governmental 
organizations (NGO), technical and 
academic community, civil society and 
the individuals acting on their own 
behalf. The last group obviously 
combines a wide variety of actors but a 
further refine would lead to a 
unmanageably complicated typology.32 
Apart from the distinction of different 
actors governance arrangements can 
also vary according to the authority 
relations between these actors. Four 
ideal-typical possibilities are available 
for consideration, namely (i) hierarchy, 
(ii) homogeneous polyarchy, (iii) 
heterogeneous polyarchy, and (iv) 
anarchy.33 Hierarchy entails relations 
of super- and subordination (command 
and obey structure), usually given in 
the context of states, polyarchy 
encompasses situation where the 
authority is distributed among several 
actors, having either (homogeneously) 
similar formal powers or 
                                            
32
  See also LAURA DENARDIS/MARK RAYMOND, 
Thinking Clearly about Multistakeholder 
Governance, GigaNet, November 2013, at p. 
9, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstra
ct_id=2354377. 
33
  DENARDIS/RAYMOND (fn 32), at p. 10.   
(heterogeneously) different formal 
powers. In case of anarchy no 
authority relations exist. 
Apart from the more theoretical 
aspects practical considerations must 
also gain importance, for example on 
the following questions: (i) How can 
greater transparency and dialogue 
between different civil society groups 
and standards experts be introduced? 
(ii) How can it be ensured that the 
benefits of rapid standard making are 
maintained even with the additional 
scrutiny due to increasing 
multistakeholder arrangements?34 
2. Changing Roles in 
Processes 
A key issue of the multistakeholder 
participation approach concerns the 
identification of the roles executed by 
the manifold stakeholders. The Report 
of the Working Group on Internet 
Governance (WGIG) of June 2005 and 
the Tunis Agenda are silent on the 
term of the “respective roles”.35 The 
problems for the interpretation of this 
term due to its ambiguity have caused 
substantive drawbacks during the last 
few years.36 
Obviously, the definition of the 
respective roles is a complex (and so 
far in Internet governance 
“unfinished”37) task, depending on the 
                                            
34
  See also IAN BROWN/CHRISTOPHER T. MARSDEN, 
Regulating Code: Good Governance and 
better Regulation in the Information Age, 
Cambridge MA/London 2013, at p. 202. 
35
  For more details see DORIA (fn 28), at pp. 123-
127. 
36
  See BERTRAND DE LA CHAPELLE, 
Multistakeholder Governance, MIND No. 2, 
September 2011, 14-25, at p. 15, calling the 
wording “in their respective roles” a perfect 
example of what diplomats usually describe as 
constructive ambiguity, namely an agreement 
on terms that conceal a disagreement of 
substance. 
37
  DORIA (fn 28), at pp.126/7. 
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capabilities and needs of the 
stakeholders. A reasonable model 
should recognize that the respective 
roles differ at different times in the 
process of governance. An analysis 
could break the process into a set of 
stages, namely framing, drafting, 
validation, implementation and 
disputes. 
A proper treatment of these aspects 
needs to enlarge the scope of 
traditional research. A multidisciplinary 
examination of the relevant questions 
is unavoidable, incorporating socio-
legal, economic, policy-oriented and 
game theory studies as well as 
interdisciplinary information studies 
drawing on socio-economic and 
political analyses.38 For the time being, 
an integrated approach has not been 
developed: the disciplines still remain 
“somewhat stove-piped in different 
silos”39 without bringing together the 
many approaches into a holistic and 
coherent scientific framework and 
associated evaluative and design 
methodologies.  
Developing a multidisciplinary 
catalogue of methodologies as well as 
the corresponding multidisciplinary 
tools can improve comprehension of 
challenges to better participative 
decision-making, including 
consideration of governance 
concepts.40 
D. Need for Improved 
Institutionalization  
Recently, the European Commission 
has also taken up the multistakeholder 
concept and proposes in its 
Communication of February 2014 as a 
basis for a common European vision 
                                            
38
  BROWN/MARSDEN (fn 34), at p. 200. 
39
  BROWN/MARSDEN (fn 34), at p. 200. 
40
  BROWN/MARSDEN (fn 34), at p. 201. 
for Internet governance the principle 
“to defend and promote fundamental 
rights and democratic values, and 
multistakeholder governance 
structures that are based on clear rules 
that respect those rights and values”,41 
“ (…) governed by a genuine 
multistakeholder model (…) where the 
necessary inter-governmental 
discussions are anchored in a 
multistakeholder context in the full 
understanding that the Internet is built 
and maintained by a variety of 
stakeholders, as well as governments; 
(…) where decisions are taken on the 
basis of principles of good governance, 
including transparency, accountability, 
and inclusiveness of all relevant 
stakeholders”.42 In No. 5 of the 
mentioned Communication, the 
European Commission describes the 
multistakeholder process under the 
headings of transparency, 
inclusiveness and balance, and 
accountability.43 
The multistakeholder concept should 
not be viewed as value in itself to be 
applied homogenously to a multiple of 
governance functions.44 Moreover, for 
example in respect of cyberspace 
regulation, an appropriate and 
efficacious approach should attempt to 
determine what types of governance 
are optimal for promoting a suitable 
regime in any particular functional and 
political context. Such concept would 
lead to a granular taxonomy and would 
most likely achieve different results in 
                                            
41
  EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, Internet Policy and Governance, 
Europe’s Role in shaping the future of Internet 
Governance, COM(2014) 72 final of February 
12, 2014, at p. 2. 
42
  EUROPEAN COMMISSION (fn 41), at p. 3. 
43
  EUROPEAN COMMISSION (fn 41), at p. 6. 
44
  DENARDIS/RAYMOND (fn 32), at p. 2. 
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respect of the manifold substantive 
topics such as freedom of expression, 
cybersecurity, standard setting 
(protocols, routers), interoperability, 
operational stability, treatment of 
Internet service providers, etc.45 
IV. Multilayer Governance for 
Enhanced Cooperation 
Based on the discussed 
considerations, the concept of 
multilayer governance should be made 
fruitful in the concretization of the 
multistakeholder participation and 
enhanced cooperation approach since 
this concept helps to understand 
governance and makes it a more 
productively apprehended iteration of 
the governmentality paradox. The 
concept of the multilayer governance 
also allows to understand enhanced 
cooperation as an opportunity 
focussing on end users and 
fundamental (human) rights that allow 
to challenge the attempts of allocating 
more power to authoritarian regimes.  
A. Examples of Enhanced 
Cooperation 
In the meantime, a number of bodies 
have been established which realize 
the enhanced cooperation approach to 
a certain extent: 
(i) The most obvious body, using 
“enhanced cooperation” in its name, is 
the Working Group on Enhanced 
Cooperation (WGEC) which has been 
established in 2012 with the objective 
to examine the mandate of the World 
Summit on the Information Society 
(WSIS) having introduced the 
multistakeholder concept and to 
prepare recommendations on how to 
                                            
45
  See also DENARDIS/RAYMOND (fn 32), at p. 2. 
fully implement this mandate.46 The 
WGEC is composed of twenty-two 
governmental officers and five 
representatives from the different 
communities at stake. The activities of 
the WGEC are relatively transparent 
and this body seeks to get the input 
from manifold sources. 
(ii) In the context of Internet 
governance the earliest and still most 
well-known body establishing 
enhanced cooperation is the Internet 
Governance Forum (IGF). Already the 
Tunis Agenda (Paras. 68/69)47 
recognizes the “need for enhanced 
cooperation” and mandates the UN 
Secretary-General to start the “process 
towards enhanced cooperation” (Para. 
71) with the involvement of all 
stakeholders. The tasks directly 
contributing to the enhanced 
cooperation are described in detail in 
the Tunis Agenda (Paras. 72 and 77). 
Without any doubt the IGF does have 
an impact on the development of public 
policies even if the degree of influence 
is partly differently assessed. Over the 
years governments also realized that 
the IGF is a factor in policy-driving 
which makes it advisable to actively 
participate in the deliberations. 
On other geographic levels, bodies 
similar to the IGF have been 
established; practically each region 
incorporated a multistakeholder forum, 
for example the EuroDIG exists for 
Europe since 2008, and many 
countries got a national forum. Since 
these regional bodies are dealing with 
Internet issues more closely related the 
                                            
46
  For more detailed information see 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/CSTD/WGEC.aspx. 
47
  Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, 18 
November 2005, available at 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.ht
ml. 
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actual politics, their impact can be 
quite substantial.   
(iii) On the national level Brazil has 
made a remarkable experience of 
multistakeholder cooperation in relation 
to Internet issues, embodied in the 
Brazilian Internet Steering Committee 
(CGI. br). The outcome of the 
multistakeholder dialogue can be seen 
in several initiatives which have been 
carried out by CGI. br.48  
(iv) Under the auspices of the United 
Nation, the Commission on Science 
and Technology for Development 
(CSTD) having been created in 1992 
promotes dialog and fosters 
partnership between intergovernmental 
organizations and non-governmental 
organizations (NGO) that have, 
however, only a consultative status.49 
The main concretization of the 
enhanced cooperation model consists 
in the establishment of the already 
mentioned WGEC. 
(v) In the framework of ICANN, the 
international domain names ccTLD 
Fast Track can be qualified as an 
example of an enhanced cooperation 
process within the set of organizations 
managing the technical functions of the 
Internet.50 In contrast to the CSTD 
incorporating enhanced cooperation 
from the perspective of the public side, 
                                            
48
  For further details SAMANTHA 
DICKINSON/WILLIAM H. DUTTON/MARILIA 
MACIEL/DESIREE MILOSHEVIC/VLADIMIR 
RADUNOVIC, Enhanced Cooperation in 
Governance, Oxford Internet Institute (OII) 
Forum Discussion Paper, University of Oxford, 
7 January 2014, at p. 13, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstra
ct_id=2376807. 
49
  For further information see 
DICKINSON/DUTTON/MACIEL/MILOSHEVIC/ 
 RADUNOVIC (fn 48), at p. 16. 
50
  For further information see 
DICKINSON/DUTTON/MACIEL/MILOSHEVIC/ 
 RADUNOVIC (fn 48), at p. 19. 
the ccTLD Fast Track is designed from 
the perspective of a private regime.  
 
B. Insights from the ISOC 
Questionnaire on 
Multistakeholder Governance 
Bearing in mind that 
multistakeholderism is not a static 
concept but a phenomenon in constant 
transition, the Internet Society (ISOC) 
launched a multiphased process to 
understand how the Internet 
community is thinking about 
multistakeholder governance and the 
associated notion of “enhanced 
cooperation”. The process´ first phase 
included a questionnaire,51 asking for 
feedback regarding (i) multistakeholder 
governance, (ii) enhanced cooperation 
and (iii) challenges ahead. During the 
questionnaire´s time frame for reply of 
two months52 around 300 individuals 
from more than 50 countries together 
with a variety of stakeholder groups 
participated in the survey.53 
With regard to the aspect of “enhanced 
cooperation”, the questionnaire´s 
evaluation revealed that the 
compatibility between the 
multistakeholder principles and the 
“enhanced cooperation”-model is still 
an essential question; whereas in the 
past the process of “enhanced 
cooperation” has been presented as a 
“threat to multistakeholderism and a 
return to intergovernmental forms of 
                                            
51
  See INTERNET SOCIETY, Questionnaire on 
Multistakeholder Governance, Report and 
Summary, October 2013, available at 
http://www.internetsociety.org/doc/internet-
society-questionnaire-multistakeholder-
governance-report-and-summary-results-
october. 
52
  The questionnaire stayed open for reply 
starting August 2 - September 30, 2014. 
53
  Internet Society (fn 51), at p. 3.  
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governance”,54 the questionnaire´s 
respondents are now of the opinion 
that “enhanced cooperation” might be 
“an opportunity to strengthen and 
improve multistakeholder 
governance”.55 
In this context, two different 
perspectives have emerged:56 On the 
one hand, respondents see “enhanced 
cooperation” as a United Nations 
and/or governments´ hidden attempt 
for taking over the Internet at the 
expense of existing multistakeholder 
arrangements; the respondents´ 
majority on the other hand viewed the 
process of “enhanced cooperation” as 
being an opportunity for improved 
Internet governance mechanisms and 
the development of multistakeholder 
practices.57 
This academic paper is part of the 
process´s second phase consisting in 
preparing research outputs on a variety 
of issues such as (i) tracking the 
historical evolution of multistakeholder 
governance, (ii) identifying the 
parameters of “enhanced cooperation” 
or (iii) identifying the potential impact of 
multistakeholderism in the overall 
Internet governance landscape.58 In 
particular, this paper analyzes the 
multi-layer model as foundation of a 
practically established enhanced 
cooperation.  
                                            
54
  Internet Society (fn 51), at p. 3. 
55
  Internet Society (fn 51), at p. 3. 
56
  Internet Society (fn 51), at p. 8. 
57
  For more detailed information regarding the 
two different perspectives see Internet Society 
(fn 51), at pp. 8/9. 
58
  Internet Society (fn 51), at p. 4. 
C. Enhanced Cooperation and 
Democracy 
Already the WGIG-Report59 of 2005 
has addressed the question to what 
extent enhanced cooperation and 
multistakeholderism could contribute to 
participatory democracy, taking into 
account that democracy is defined in 
different ways, mainly in a multilateral 
context and by different stakeholders 
according to their particular 
perspectives. Whereas governments 
hold to a view which is based on 
national sovereignty and the 
participation of (qualified) citizens 
according to the constitutional 
decision-making mechanism, civil 
society advocates usually argue that 
participatory democracy should be 
understood in a broader way, requiring 
direct and full participation in the 
decision-building by many non-
governmental groups from the private 
sector and the population. 
The origins of democracy can be 
traced back to the Greek words 
“demos” meaning “people”, and 
“kratos”, referring to “rule” and 
“strength”, thus the “rule of people”, 
also called “politeia” by Aristotle, 
meaning the “rule of many”.60 In this 
sense, democracy complies with the 
functions expected from governance 
which acknowledges individual civil as 
well as political rights. This 
assessment, in turn, emphasizes the 
fundamental assumption that citizens’ 
freedom of self-determination is the 
basis of the democratic state per se; 
                                            
59
  Report of the Working Group on Internet 
Goveranance, Juni 2005, available at 
http://www.wgig.org/docs/WGIGREPORT.pdf. 
60
  WEBER (fn 19), at p. 112. 
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such an interpretation is also referred 
to as “the democratic principle”.61  
Adopting democracy as a legitimizing 
concept for international governance, 
thus expanding its scope beyond 
national states, raises several 
questions; therefore, scholars have 
addressed international democracy 
rather differently.62 Whereas one 
approach envisions the gradual 
disappearance of the states’ system 
and its replacement by a world-wide 
democratic government,63 
representatives of the “pan-national 
democracy” picture the achievements 
of global democracy through 
democratization at the level of each 
state.64 Additionally, the concept of 
“cosmopolitan democratic law” has 
been developed, encompassing the 
establishment of “a democratic public 
law entrenched within and across 
borders”65 and making democracy 
within states and democracy in 
international affairs mutually supportive 
developments. 66  
As far as representatives of civil 
society are concerned, basic legitimacy 
problems cause questions, namely: 
Who does in fact represent civil 
society? How have the representatives 
been selected? In the context of the 
recent NetMundial some voices have 
been raised that “speakers” of civil 
                                            
61
  JEREMY MALCOLM, Multi-Stakeholder 
Governance and the Internet Governance 
Forum, Perth 2008, at p. 227. 
62
  WEBER (fn 19), at p. 115. 
63
  WEBER (fn 19), at p. 115. 
64
  SUSAN MARKS, Democracy and International 
Governance, in: JEAN-MARC COICAUD/VEIJO 
HEISKANEN (eds), The Legitimacy of 
International Organizations, Tokyo/New 
York/Paris 2001, 45-68, at p. 52. 
65
  DAVID HELD, Democracy and the Global Order, 
From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan 
Governance, Cambridge/Oxford 1995, at p. 
227; see als MALCOLM (fn 61), at pp. 236 et 
seq. and 243 et seq. 
66
  MARKS (fn 64), at p. 53. 
society have not really been mandated 
in a proper way and did not fully take 
into consideration all opinions 
expressed by members of civil society.  
More general questions to legitimacy 
elements could read as follows:67 Who 
can be the legitimate stakeholder in a 
multi-layer framework (for which 
layer)? Do the same criteria for 
legitimacy apply in a multi-layer regime 
than in the traditional regime? What 
importance does legitimacy have in a 
multi-layer environment? Is not the 
inclusion of many stakeholders 
legitimizing enough? 
A specific aspect in the Internet 
governance context concerns the 
problem that each individual is situated 
in a complex world of capabilities and 
needs and that each individual usually 
belongs to several stakeholder groups. 
As a consequence, the sole 
representation of an individual as 
citizen, while necessary, is often not 
sufficient; however, the voices of many 
groups will lead to myriads of interests. 
No single type of stakeholder group 
can serve all of the aspects of global 
population in cyberspace. Therefore, 
new processes enshrining legitimacy 
issues and participation requirements 
need to be developed. 
D. Enhanced Cooperation through 
Fair Processes of Consensus-
Building 
Multi-stakeholderism as a general 
concept should not conceal the fact 
that rather big differences among the 
very different players remain since 
influential states will remain very 
powerful players in a multi-stakeholder 
setting as compared to developing 
states or individual representatives of 
                                            
67
  WEBER (fn 19), at pp. 105/6. 
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civil society, for example.68 
Consequently, for enabling “real” 
consensus among all stakeholders 
involved, procedures need to be 
established giving bargaining power to 
and ensure equal opportunities for all 
stakeholders.69  
With regard to these rather unequal 
starting positions of the different 
stakeholders involved, mechanisms 
are necessary to enable participation 
and interaction to take place in fair 
terms, so as to give different 
stakeholders a real voice.70 
Additionally, it is thus crucial that 
organizations governing the Internet 
inform their stakeholders 
comprehensively and in a timely 
manner and make effective use of the 
information flow on the Internet. As a 
consequence, the involvement in 
decision-making processes should 
strengthen public confidence in the 
decisions taken and enhance their 
legitimacy.71  
With the affected stakeholders 
delineated, legitimacy could be 
improved by adhering to particular 
architectural principles reflecting the 
multilayer governance approach; such 
key principles need to be considered 
as a source for legislation and a 
guideline for governing different 
aspects of the Internet.72 Consensus 
on “architectural” values would be of 
                                            
68
  KONSTANTINOS KOMAITIS, Aristotle, Europe and 
Internet Governance, Pacific McGeorge Global 
Business and Development Law Journal 21 
(2008), 57-77, at p. 57. 
69
  JONATHAN WEINBERG, ICANN and the Problem 
of Legitimacy, Duke Law Journal 50 (2000), 
187-260, at pp. 255/6. 
70
  WEBER (fn 19), at p. 118. 
71
  ROLF H. WEBER/ROMANA WEBER, Inclusion of 
the Civil Society in the Governance of the 
Internet, Can Lessons be Drawn from the 
Environmental Legal Framework?, Computer 
Law Review International 1 (2009), 9-15, at p. 
9. 
72
  WEBER (fn 19), at p. 119. 
help for establishing a particular form 
of stability.73  
 
V. Outlook 
A model of enhanced cooperation 
including a large number of 
stakeholders will have benefits if the 
governance environment is going to 
change in order to adapt to the new 
circumstances:74 
(i) Governmental officials will need 
to learn to sit at the table with other 
stakeholders on an equal footing (as 
already practiced in certain situations). 
(ii)  Businesses will need to become 
more transparent; instead of lobbying 
in governmental and parliamentarian 
circles, commercial entities will have to 
present their arguments in 
multistakeholder fora. 
(iii)  Civil society should move away 
from ideological purity and develop 
flexible mechanisms in the 
organizational structure securing 
appropriate legitimacy and 
participation. Civil society should also 
give up the so-called “victim mantra” by 
trying to work inside the system with 
those who have power. 
(iv) Technological experts need to 
give up the comfort of believing that 
science and technology are free of 
financial and political aspects, i.a. 
technologists need to learn to 
communicate and cooperate with 
policy concerns. Conversely, policy 
advocates have to learn to understand 
and cope with technological realities. 
                                            
73
  IAN CLARK, Legitimacy in International Society, 
New York 2005, at pp. 15-17. 
74
  DORIA (fn 28), at pp. 135/6, as phrased in 
respect of multistakeholder participation.  
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The need to improve and implement 
the concept of “enhanced cooperation” 
is widely acknowledged in the 
meantime. Most available fora such as 
the IGF and the WGEC, however, lack 
so far decision-making power, only 
allowing discussions and deliberations 
without including the right to release 
binding motions.75 This fact does not 
mean that fora such as the IGF or the 
WGEC should be vested with 
sovereign power. Moreover, the 
principle of a multilayer regime 
requires accepting different forms of 
rulemaking by different institutions.  
But the principles agreed upon in the 
manifold fora need to be linked into a 
comprehensive structure. This 
objective can be achieved if legal 
interoperability is improved; legal 
interoperability is the process of 
making legal rules work together 
across jurisdiction.76 In view of the 
increasing fragmentation of the Internet 
efforts should be undertaken to 
achieve higher levels of legal 
interoperability in order to facilitate 
informational and commercial 
exchanges.77  
Even with improved legal operability, 
some variability continues to be 
caused by the enforcement 
mechanisms (“law in action”) that might 
drive the decision on implementing a 
top-down approach or a bottom-up 
process.78 The multilayer concept 
attempting to achieve the suitable legal 
interoperability can insofar be seen as 
example of a hybrid regulation.  
 
                                            
75
  See WEBER (fn 19), at pp. 70/71, FRANKLIN (fn 
22), at pp. 154 et seq.  
76
  JOHN PALFREY/URS GASSER, Interop: the 
Promise and Perils of Highly Interconnected 
Systems, New York 2012, at p. 178. 
77
  PALFREY (fn 76), at pp. 178/179. 
78
  PALFREY (fn 76), at pp. 184/185. 
